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Information Technology Sourcing Research: 




The paper complements earlier reviews by further examining  thirteen years of 
academic IT sourcing  studies. It finds  them rich with much empirical survey and case 
research findings,  but  still marked by inconsistencies, a plethora of concepts, research 
approaches, ambivalent terminology, and a lack of consistency and common focus  
across different research groupings. It then looks at a limited set of internally consistent 
research studies carried out by the authors to come to more positive conclusions about 
how in detail, organizations have moved up the IT sourcing learning curve. This 
learning is classified under four headings: assessment of the back-office portfolio; 
evaluation of market options; the crafting of outsourcing arrangements and the 
management of external relationships. The paper concludes by offering five areas for 
future research in IT sourcing.  
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Information Technology Sourcing Research: 




The information technology (ITO) and business process (BPO) outsourcing services 
markets, together with more recent offshore variants, have been dynamically expanding 
revenues, capabilities and associated rhetoric, in equal measure, for over fifteen years. 
Outsourcing makes up a substantial and rapidly rising part of expenditure across 
corporations and government agencies alike.  On our estimates, ITO global revenues  
exceeded $200 billion per year at   the end of  2005.  After, and indeed partly because 
of, the slowdown between 2001-2004 this figure will rise by at least 7% per annum for 
the next five years.  Of  this, offshoring ($US 7 billion in 2004) will probably rise to $17 
billion by 2008.  Additionally, mainstream BPO expenditure in areas such as the human 
resource function, procurement, back office administration, call centres, finance and 
accounting, is set to rise from $US110 billion in 2003 to $US 175 billion in 2008 
(Willcocks and Lacity, 2006). Use of external IT/BP services combined is likely to 
move from a 2005 average of 12% to 20% of the corporation’s total costs by 2008/9.  
For many organisations, then, outsourcing is well above the parapet in sheer expenditure 
terms.  However, much of this has been happening incrementally, as a response to 
immediate market conditions and specific opportunities to cut costs, rather than through 
long-term strategic thinking.. Moreover,  despite the accumulated experience, learning 
has been painfully slow; there has been mixed success, and  much conflicting advice. 
 
This paper seeks to complement and build on previous substantial reviews of IT 
sourcing research   by Dibbern et al (2004) and Hui and Beath (2001).  Here  our  
critical review of  the academic  studies from 1991-2005 is limited to  identifying and 
discussing four major on-going problem areas, namely: defining outsourcing, defining 
types of outsourcing, measuring success, and clarifying  the processes that lead to 
effective outsourcing arrangements.  Thereafter, the paper focuses on  a more limited, 
internally consistent body of academic studies with a view to identifying what can be 
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learned from the fifteen years of research these embody.   Finally, the paper suggests  
future potentially profitable avenues for research in the IT/BP  (out)sourcing space. 
 
Evolution and Critique  Of The Literature 
The ITO literature as a genre got its official start in 1991 with  studies of Eastman 
Kodak’s outsourcing initiative (Applegate Montealegre, 1991; Loh, and Venkatraman, 
1992b), along with the first works around that time focused on software outsourcing 
(Whang, 1992; Ang and Beath, 1993).  The early ITO studies (1992-1994) 
predominately concerned themselves with the identification of characteristics regarding 
firms that outsource (Loh and Venkatraman, 1992a; Arnett and Jones, 1994, Cullen, 
1994) and this concern has continued (Oh, 2005).  In addition, the tradition of empirical 
work that still dominates ITO research began in 1993 with Huber’s (1993) classic case 
study on Continental Bank and Lacity and Hirschheim’s case studies (1993abc); along 
with the first ITO survey-based research (Heinzl, 1993).  The first work on success in 
ITO began in 1994 with Heckman, and King (1994) and Lacity, et al. (1994) both of 
which focused on satisfaction.  Also during the period was the first of many studies on 
the impact of outsourcing on various variables, that of Loh and Venkatraman’s (1992c) 
finding that stock prices in the US were positively affected by ITO announcements, still 
highly cited today. 
 
There has been a steady stream of ITO research since that time, first peaking in 1995 
and again in 1998. Figure 1 details the major academic studies in the 1991-2004 period 
appearing as  books or articles published in top ranking journals. The most 
comprehensive review of the ITO literature by Dibbern et al (2004) list 212 references 
but  many of these are not specifically IT outsourcing studies. We also leave out non-
academic studies – of which there have been many, and the recently burgeoning parallel 
literature on business process outsourcing.     
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Figure 1: ITO Research Chronology 







































The years 1995 to 1998 were a defining period in ITO research growth, averaging 17 
published studies a year from the sample - a period of research growth we have not 
experienced since, though ITO/BPO and offshore studies started (but not yet published) 
in the 2004/5 period seems to have experienced a real acceleration.   Much of the work 
performed during 1995-8 remains the cornerstone of current ITO research.  For example 
Grover et al. (1996)’s success instrument, based in part on Parsuraman et al.’s (1988) 
SERVQUAL instrument, is still used today unchanged from its original form (see for 
example Rouse, et al 2001; Lee et al. 2004).   
 
This period began the flow of a wide variant of theories, assumptions, mixed findings, 
and contradictions that continues to time of writing (2006).  Solutions to the many 
inconsistencies were a major plea to researchers from the two most comprehensive 
reviews of the ITO literature (Hui and Beath, 2002; Dibbern et al., 2004).1 Those 
wanting a more comprehensive analysis of the ITO literature are referred to these 
studies. Here we focus on the more limited aim of evaluating issues with the literature, 
before reporting on our own detailed  findings from over twelve years of research in the 
area. 
 
1 Hui and Beath (2002) provide a broad review of 143 papers and books and Dibbern et al. (2004) provide 
a more detailed review of using 84 studies sourced from 19 journals and 2 conferences from 1988 to 
2000.  Both provide excellent tables summarizing the theoretical bases of the vast array of different 
studies.   
7
Defining Outsourcing 
The most fundamental contradiction in the ITO literature is regarding what ITO actual 
is.  Definitions of ITO abound, with little consistency or agreement in sight.  The only 
concept in common amongst the various definitions is the recognition that a third-party 
is involved with IT in some manner.  Why do we need to understand how each study 
defined outsourcing?  Simply because minor variants in terminology can result in the 
study of different phenomenon, or of various subsets of the possible outsourcing 
population. Take for example, Lee, et al.’s (2004) statement that, “larger organizations 
are more likely to outsource” (p117) without providing the basis for this statement.  In 
fact, early research has not found correlation to firm size (measured by firm revenue, 
assets, and number of employees) and the degree of outsourcing (Loh and Venkatraman, 
1992a; Cullen, 1994), found to be the case again more recently (Oh, 2005), all of which 
used Loh and Venkatraman’s definition of ITO.  However, firm size (as measured by 
assets) showed a strong relationship with the degree of outsourcing in the US banking 
industry (Ang and Straub, 1998).  One could easily suppose that the banking industry is 
different from other industries.  Or perhaps the different findings are due to the study of 
different phenomenon.  Ang and Straub (1998) included many arguably non-
infrastructure areas in their study including IS strategy, planning, as well as applications 
development and maintenance.   
 
Table 1 about here 
--------------------------- 
 
Table 1 – The 151 case ITO study
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Table 1 – The 151 ITO Research Sample
1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
• Applegate &
Montealegre
• Whang • Loh &
Venkatraman
(a, b, c)





























• Grover, et al.






• Klepper (a, b)












• Sobol & Apte




























• Apte & Sobol
• Elitzur &
Wensley





• Saunders, et al.
• Venkatraman













































































• Kern et al.
• Lacity &
Willcocks







• Goles & Chin




• Kern, et al
• Kern, et al.
• Kern, et al.
• Klein
• Knolmayer

















• Koh, et al.







et al. (a, b)
1 4 8 12 20 15 11 22 9 13 6 14 7 9
As mentioned earlier, Loh and Venkatraman (1992a) kicked off an early definition of ITO as, 
“a significant contribution by external venders in the physical and/or human resources 
associated with the entire or specific components of the IT infrastructure in the user 
organization”, which is still employed today (Oh, 2005).  This definition emphasizes IT 
infrastructure, and could be interpreted to exclude applications development to which much 
ITO research has been devoted (Kern, et al. 2002a, Susarla, et al. 2003; Dibbern, 2004); 
however, the studies that employ the infrastructure definition do not explicitly state any 
exclusions to this definition.  Even studies that do explicitly state what the adopted ITO 
definition excludes in terms of potential services (for example Grover, et al. 1996) appear to 
unintentionally exclude other phenomenon in the outsourcing population. 
 
Some definitions of ITO restrict it to involving a transfer or turning over of something to a 
vendor such as functions, assets, responsibilities, and/or people (Grover, et al. 1996; Apte, et al. 
1997; Cheon, et al. 1995; Hirschheim and Lacity, 2000).  Consequently, if a researcher uses this 
definition, arguably outsourcing which did not involve a transfer would be excluded although no 
researcher adopting this definition made this explicit.  In using this definition, many non-transfer 
types of outsourcing would not be considered outsourcing.  For example, in a survey of 235 
organizations in Australia, only 27% involved staff transfers (Cullen, et al. 2001).  Therefore, a 
transfer-based definition restricts the study to a small subsection of the possible outsourcing 
population – in effect under 30%.  Furthermore, transfers only occur during the first generation of 
a contract (first time outsourcing) and subsequent generations involve either extending the 
contract with the incumbent, switching to a new supplier, or backsourcing (bringing outsourced 
services back in-house).  In practice, all the above occur (Cullen and Willcocks, 2003).  A 
transfer-based definition excludes all but the first generation of any deal, not to mention that 
many first generation outsourcing deals do not involve a transfer at all (Cullen, et al. 2001).  
 
Other studies limit the definition of outsourcing to only those services or functions previously 
conducted in-house (Lacity and Hirschheim, 1993a), thereby excluding work performed by third 
parties which had not been conducted previously by the client organization.  Again, researchers 
adopting this definition do not explicitly state that their intention is to exclude work not 
previously conducted by the client.  If one does make this assumption, once again a significant 
portion of the possible outsourcing population would be excluded.  Using the example of the 
Australian survey of 235 organizations (Cullen, et al. 2001), 72% of respondents outsourced to 
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obtain services not available in house.  Once again, a prior insourced-based definition restricts the 
study to a small subsection, under 30% of the possible population, and a different subsection than 
that using the transfer-based definition. 
 
Still others describe ITO as “commissioning”, or “contracting” a vendor to run the organization’s 
resources (Fitzgerald and Willcocks, 1994; Kern, 1997), inferring that the organization still owns 
the resources.  However, as Cullen et al (2005) show, many possible variants of resource 
ownership occur and the client organization may not retain all or part of the resource base (assets, 
facilities, and staff).  Researchers who adopted this definition did not explicitly state what 
possible form of outsourcing was intended to be excluded; however, it would be logical to deduce 
that if the client owns none of the resources, exclusion would occur.  The use of this definition 
again restricts the possible outsourcing population substantially and represents a different 
phenomenon from definitions restricted to only infrastructure, to only work previous conducted 
in-house, and to only outsourcing which involved an act of a transfer. 
 
Lastly, others merely state that outsourcing is, “the provision of services by a vendor firm to a 
client” (Klepper 1995b), or “third-party provision of IT products and services” (Hancox and 
Hackney, 1999), hence anything a third party can do for a firm. This definition views 
outsourcing more akin to Williamson’s (1985) hierarchical and market governance 
alternatives – a firm can perform an activity or a third party can.  Thus, the possible 
population includes all the above population subsets, in addition to all generations of a deal, 
those that remain with an incumbent supplier as well as those that procure new vendor/s, all 
deals regardless if a transfer occurred, all resource ownership possibilities, and any work an 
external party performs regardless if the organization had previously performed it. 
 
Different perspectives on what outsourcing is are not the only things limiting the 
phenomenon under study.  For example, Gallivan and Oh’s (1999) foremost conclusion was 
that managers must be aware that there are more options than the traditional dyad (one buyer, 
one seller).  Nonetheless, recent studies intentionally exclude all but a simple dyad from their 
research.  For example, Lee et al.’s (2004) requested the 311 respondents to their survey to 
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choose a “dominant” supplier if the firm had more than one supplier.  This approach would 
have excluded over 50% of the possible outsourcing population in Australia – all those 
without a dominant supplier (14% with many suppliers under individual contracts and 27% 
with many suppliers under panel arrangements) in Cullen et al. (2001).  
Defining Types of Outsourcing 
ITO researchers have not agreed  definitions of different types of  ITO. Thus different 
perspectives on the phenomenon under study fall under a common label,  despite there being 
no common terminology set  in which to take and test ideas, constructs, or theories. For 
example, Millar (1994) describes value-added outsourcing as where the supplier is able to 
add value to the activity that could not be cost effectively provided in-house.  Klepper and 
Jones (1998) describe it as an “intermediate” relationship characterized by complex work and 
substantial benefits.  Lacity and Willcocks (1998) define it as when the parties combine to 
market new products and services.  No one definition has been adopted. As another example, 
Currie (1998) identified “facility sharing” as sharing all the key tangible resources including 
facility, assets, and labor which Lee, et al. (2004) identified as a “partnership”.  But Lacity 
and Hirschheim (1993) and Hackney (1999) defined partnerships as descriptors of 
negotiation techniques, power balancing, and a collection of intangible characteristics such as 
compatible cultures finding the term at odds with the actual contractual relationship, but 
without referring to the expression in terms of resource ownership as did Currie and Lee, et 
al.  Grover et al. (1996) set up “partnership” as a mediating variable in their study.  
Partnership was defined as in terms of descriptive elements ranging from long-term 
commitment, sense of mutual cooperation, shared risk and benefits, as well as equal 
responsibility.  Again, no one definition has been adopted.  It is not surprising then, that 
Lacity and Willcocks (1998) found “partnerships” to be more unsuccessful, which Lee, et al. 
(2004) found no support. 
 
As a last example especially indicative of the problem, equity relationships are where the 
parties have some form of shared equity, called “cross-equity” (Venkatraman, 1997) and 
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“equity-holding” (Lacity and Willcocks, 1998).  Dibbern et al. (2004) only refers to a 
possible equity structure as a “joint ventures” defined as joint equity in an IT function spun 
off by the client organization.  However, Ang and Cummings (1997) deemed related entities 
providing services to other related entities as “insourcing”.  “Insourcing” has been defined as 
by Hirschheim and Lacity (2000) as “the practice of evaluating the outsourcing option, but 
confirming the continued use of internal IT resources to achieve the same objectives of 
outsourcing”.  Whereas Lacity and Willcocks (1996; 1998; 2001) defined insourcing as when 
20% or less of the budget is outsourced, which Lee et al. (2004) called “minimal outsourcing”.  
This particular example covered a great deal of divergence, each term leading to a different 
definition, or different term for the same definition.  If nothing else, ITO research needs a 
common dictionary. 
 
Even more significant, studies offer conflicting advice regarding how firms should go about 
making outsourcing successful.  For example, conflicting advice over long- versus short-term 
contracts abounds.  Earl (1996) believes the uncertainty involving IT and the requirement to 
experiment in its application precludes having long-term contracts.  Klepper and Jones (1998) 
argue that long-term contracts enable the supplier to learn about the organization and for the 
parties to establish mutual trust.  Lee et al. (2004) note that in certain cultures, like South 
Korea, longer-term contracts are a reflection of the value that the culture places on long-term 
relationships.  Lacity and Willcocks (1998) found that short-term contracts yielded greater 
cost savings.  Lee et al. (2004) found the reverse.  However, all these studies assume a single-
term, which has not been the norm for some time.  Single-term deals are fixed-duration 
contracts that expire on a specified date and do not provide for extensions.  Both Lacity and 
Willcocks (1998) and Lee et al. (2004) defined short-term as under four years, medium-term 
as four up to seven years, and long-term as seven years or more.  However, Cullen (2005), for 
example,  cites a government agency with a 3+3 arrangement - it has a three year initial term 
with an option to extend for another three years.  Simple classifications as short versus long 
term do not match the current flexibility that contracts more typically incorporate. 
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Another example of conflicting advice regarding successful outsourcing structures is the 
degree of outsourcing performed.  Lacity and Willcocks (1998; 2001) and Sambamurthy et 
al. (2001) suggest that “selective” is more successful than “total” outsourcing, the latter being 
where at least 80% of the IT budget is outsourced to a single supplier – the assumption being 
success is a function of exposed risk to a single supplier.  Yet Rouse et al. (2001) report that 
the probabilities for those engaged in selective outsourcing were statistically no different—
for cost savings or for business flexibility and Lee et al. (2004) found selective sourcing to be 
no more successful that other degrees of outsourcing. 
 
How is one to interpret such contradictory findings?  One possibility is that success has been 
measured differently (therefore incomparably) in different studies (Hui and Beath, 2002; Lee, 
et al. 2004; Dibbern, et al. 2004).  In fact, despite over decade of research into ITO, no single 
model of success has emerged from the literature.  Another possibility is that it is a mistake to 
treat all ITO arrangements as instances of the same phenomenon: outsourcing involves a 
variety of choices that result in widely differing types and forms of arrangements (Marcolin 
and McLellan, 1998; Dibbern, et al. 2004).  Thus conflicting results could be due to 
comparing ‘apples and oranges’; or quite different things as if they are the same.   
 
There has been no definitive work on the different forms ITO takes.  Many studies identify 
limited options, for example, Lacity and Willcocks (1998; 2001) in differentiating total 
outsourcing from selective outsourcing.  Different functional or service scope has been well 
recognized with many studies on specific IT functions such as software outsourcing (Whang, 
1992; Ang and Beath, 1993), ASP (Bennett and Timbrell, 2000; Dewire, 2000; Kern, et al. 
2001) as well as more comprehensive studies (Ang and Straub, 1998; Oh, 2005).  But all 
possible alternatives have not been brought together in a manner such that every study has a 
common base in which to refer to the type of outsourcing under study.  Much generalization 
has occurred without giving due consideration to the different forms of outsourcing.  It is 
apparent that research needs a common base in which to fundamentally understand ITO and 
norms around  this understanding. This is not something attempted here but Cullen (2005) 
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has contributed work on how to define the  configuration of outsourcing arrangements to 
further this aim.   
Defining Success 
Research established long ago  that outsourcing success is hardly guaranteed (Lacity and 
Hirschheim, 1993b).  Since then, many researchers have studied constructs of success, 
drivers, and management techniques.  Yet, the findings between studies are often inconsistent 
(Hui and Beath, 2002; Lee et al. 2004; Dibbern, et al. 2004).  Despite over a  decade of 
research into ITO, no single model of ITO success has emerged from the literature, and the 
more popular outsourcing becomes, the more the previously accepted benefits are coming to 
be questioned (Byrne, 1996; Fowler and Jeffs, 1998; Rouse et al., 2001.   
 
Each study regarding success, and advice on how to achieve it, is dependent on how the 
researcher defined “success”, outcomes” and “benefits”, used interchangeably in the research, 
but, in meaning,  varying considerably.  Grover et al. (1996) identified three categories: 
economic, technological, and strategic, which were further broken down into eight attributes.  
Domberger et al. (2000) performed a simple analysis of what drove a single attribute, 
“desired performance”.  Lacity and Willcocks (2001), in their summary of experiences of 116 
organizations, used three factors: objectives against results, cost reductions, and satisfaction.  
Lee et al. (2004) used three dimensions: strategic competence, cost efficiency, and 
technology catalyst from the CIO’s perspective.  Not surprisingly, different perceptions of 
what constitutes successful outsourcing have yielded conflicting advice on the degree to 
which outsourcing practices have been successful. 
 
As an example, success has often been described as the degree of cost savings (Willcocks and 
Fitzgerald, 1994; Domberger, 1998).  Yet Rouse et al. (2001) found that although cost is an 
important consideration, cost savings were not significantly associated with satisfaction with 
outsourcing.  Further, in the series of three Australian surveys (Cullen, 1994:1997; Cullen, et 
al. 2001), cost savings has been decreasing in importance with each study.  It was the number 
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one reason to outsource IT in Australia in 1994, fifth in 1997, falling to ninth in 2001. Lee et 
al. (2004) acknowledged that metrics of success need further development, and the lack of a 
comprehensive model in which to determine the explanations of success limited their study.  
They believe the prior instruments are only a starting point:  “As outsourcing grows in 
complexity, researchers need to develop more sophisticated metrics to assess the success of 
outsourcing ventures”.  Contradictory results, and advice, will continue until a replicable 
success construct is developed and accepted. Many studies identified possible outcomes 
(Lacity and Willcocks, 2001; Lee, et al. 2004; Dibbern, et. al 2004), but no study has 
attempted to encapsulate all the outcomes an organization may seek.  
Defining ITO Processes 
Over a  decade of in-depth studies demonstrates that outsourcing cannot be contracted for and 
then not managed (Cullen and Willcocks, 2003; Linder 2004; Dibbern, et al. 2004).  How 
firms go about outsourcing from concept to implementation is dispersed in many works using 
the universalistic perspective, where researchers attempt to identify “best practices”, or 
processes that positively affect performance (see for example Delery and Doty, 1996). 
However, all the studies we have reviewed look at  ‘process’ merely as a means to provide 
background information, or descriptive information – process is not the primary purpose of 
the study (for example, Lacity and Willcocks, 2001; Hui and Beath, 2002; Alborz, et al., 
2004, Dibbern, et al. 2004).  Some research has delved into specific components of the 
outsourcing process, predominately that being the decision as to whether and what to 
outsource (for example, Lacity and Hirschheim 1993abc; Ang and Cummings, 1997; 
DiRomualdo and Gurbaxani, 1998); selection of the vendor (Michell and Fitzgerald, 1997; 
Kern, et al. 2002); negotiation (Elitzur and Wensley, 1997; Kern and Willcocks, 2000a), and 
management of the relationship (Lacity and Willcocks, 2000c; Kern and Willcocks, 2001; 
Goles and Chin, 2002; Kern and Willcocks, 2002a; Alborz, et. al. 2004).   
 
There is a great deal of practitioner literature advising clients as to the process to adopt when 
outsourcing (Klepper and Jones, 1998; Aalders, 2001; Hurley and Costa, 2001). But these do 
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not  use any rigorous research methods and typically are based on a few case studies.  
Specifically, Klepper and Jones (1998) base their model on the experience of “a number” of 
CIOs and practitioners; Hurley and Costa (2001) base theirs on nine Australian cases 
provided by suppliers; and a 2001 report by the U.S. General Accounting Office based its 
model on seven U.S corporations, two suppliers, and five academic/professional authorities.  
Up to 2006,  the only academic study that purposely set out to study the process and form a 
theory as to what process works best is Cullen et al. (2005), which  provides a 
comprehensive, and granular, framework describing the key management choices regarding 
the outsourcing process.   
 
Information Technology  Sourcing: Fifteen Years of Learning  
 
Having identified the difficult work still needed to synthesise the diverse definitions, 
approaches, foci of interest  and findings  across  ITO studies so far, this paper makes a 
further, more positive contribution by identifying the findings from a more limited but 
coherent and internally consistent  stream of studies the authors  have been conducting since 
the early 1990s.  One key feature of this body of research is that we measured actual 
outcomes compared to expected outcomes in our 600 plus  longitudinal case studies and six 
surveys.  This enables us to draw conclusions as to the practices associated with success and 
failure and to analyze results over time. Based on this extensive research, the rest of the paper 
summarises the findings. First, we will comment on the degree of learning experienced in 
those fifteen years. Next we organise the research findings under four headings:  assessing 
the portfolio, evaluating market options, crafting deals, and managing relationships. The key 
summary sources are Cullen (2005) Cullen and Willcocks (2003); Lacity and Willcocks 
(2001); Lacity, Willcocks and Cullen, 2007); Kern and Willcocks (2001); and Willcocks and 
Lacity (1998; 2006).  
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The Outsourcing Learning Curve 
 
Most of our participants were from large North American, European, and Australian 
companies and few approached  outsourcing from a strategic perspective at the outset.  Most 
organizations initially engaged in  outsourcing for tactical reasons, such as seeking lower 
labour rates for staff augmentation on specific projects.  Only after pilot tests were complete, 
supplier relationships established, and viability proven, did senior executives seek more 
radical and strategic uses of global resources.  This incremental approach, we found, allowed 
organizations to gain experience with outsourcing options at an operational level before 
seeking more strategic objectives.  
 
Figure 2 illustrates the typical customer learning curve for ITO and BPO approaches and 
more recent offshore variants.  The learning curve is demonstrated through the typical 
learning of one particular outsourcing model, namely offshore outsourcing. The general mass 
of organizations using ITO are weighted towards phase 3 and 4, with some organization on 
their third or fourth generation ITO, while most BPO and offshore clients, as at 2006, were 
much further down the learning curve.      
 
During Phase I, senior executives we interviewed became aware of offshore outsourcing 
through marketing hype (‘you'll save 60% off your costs’) or irrational propaganda 
(“Software: Will Outsourcing Hurt America’s Supremacyi).  Senior executives quickly 
learned about potential benefits, costs, and risks by talking to peers, consultants, and reading 
research.  Most senior executives initially engaged in offshore outsourcing (Phase II) to seek 
lower costs, primarily through  favorable labor arbitrage.  During  pilot testing, senior 
executives learned about the immense amount of in-house management required to 
effectively work with global suppliers and to achieve real cost savings.  As learning 
accumulated, some senior executives moved to Phase III when they exploited global sourcing 
for quality as well as cost reasons.  One phrase we heard over and over again from 
participants was, "we went for the price, we stayed for the quality."
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More mature adopters in Phase IV used offshore outsourcing to enable corporate strategies, 
such as increasing business agility, bringing products to market faster and cheaper, financing 
new product development, accessing new markets, or creating new business.   These strategic 
initiatives often evolved over time.  For example, a large U.S. Financial Services firm in 2005 
used global sourcing of IT and back office functions primarily to enable strategic agility.  It 
had captive centers in Manila and Mumbai, and various joint ventures and fee-for-service 
relationships with 14 Indian suppliers. During the refinancing boom, the company was able to 
beat competitors by quickly meeting the immense surge in demand for IT and business 
process services.  As the refinancing boom burst, the company was able to immediately scale 
back resources.  But it took them fifteen years to develop this well-oiled global network. 
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While at an aggregate level, the learning curve suggests a sequential progression, at the micro level, 
learning has been iterative and concurrent.   Customers continually learned how to assess better their 
own service portfolio, evaluate suppliers' capabilities, craft contracts, and manage supplier 
relationships.  Even within the same customer-supplier relationship, customers frequently 
revisited the scope of the deal and re-crafted contracts several times. This iterative learning 
process is reflected in Figure 3. In the next sections we look at each of these four areas in  
detail. 
 













Figure 3: Learning and Feedback in  IT  Sourcing  
 
Assessment of  the Back-Office Portfolio 
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IT  As A Portfolio of Capabilities. 
We have increasingly found  sourcing strategies beginning with the assumption that back-
offices should be treated as a portfolio of activities and capabilities.  Some IT activities must 
be kept in-house to ensure current and future business advantage and flexibility, while others 
may be safely outsourced.  This portfolio perspective is empirically supported by our research 
findings that selective outsourcing decisions had a higher relative frequency of success than 
total outsourcing decisionsii. We defined the scope of sourcing options as: 
 
Total Outsourcing: the decision to transfer the equivalent of more than 80% of the function’s 
operating budget for assets, leases, staff, and management responsibility to external 
providers. 
 
Total In-Housing Sourcing: the decision to retain the management and provision of more 
than 80% of the function’s operating budget internally after evaluating the services market.  
 
Selective Outsourcing:  the decision to source selected functions from external provider(s) 
while still providing between 20% and 80%  of the function’s operating budget internally.   
 
Selective outsourcing decisions have been generally successful during the past ten years, with 
85% successes reported by 1995 and 77% reported by 2001iii. This  relates to the finding  
that selective outsourcing is also the most common sourcing practiceiv. The most commonly 
outsourced functions in IT were mainframe data centers, software development and support 
services, telecommunications/networks, and support of existing systems. The most commonly 
outsourced applications in human resources were payroll, benefits administration, and 
employee training and educationv. In most cases, suppliers were judged to have an ability to 
deliver these products and services less expensively than internal managers.   The ability to 
focus in-house resources to higher-value work also justified selective outsourcing.  
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Participants frequently encountered one or more of the following problems with total 
outsourcing: 
• excess fees for services beyond the contract due to increase in user demand 
• excess fees for services participants assumed were in the contract 
• “hidden costs” such as software license transfer fees 
• fixed-prices that exceeded market prices two to three years into the contract 
• inability to adapt the contract to even minor changes in business or technology  without 
triggering additional costs  
• lack of innovation from the supplier 
• deteriorating service in the face of patchy supplier staffing of the contract  
 
In-house sourcing has remained generally successful (67% up to 1995, 76% up to 2001vi).  
We found, however, that success stemmed from the potential threat of outsourcing.  Once 
empowered through the threat of competition, internal managers often had cost advantages 
over suppliers (such as no marketing expense, no need to generate a profit).  In addition, they 
often had service advantages, such as knowledge of idiosyncratic business applications.  
These findings hold consistent with our more recent (2001-5) research (Willcocks and Lacity, 
2006). 
 
Core In-house IT Capabilities  
There are many frameworks and theories to help managers assess core capabilities to keep in-
house.  The most popular portfolio assessment models are based on theories such as resource 
dependency theory, agency theory, auction theory, game theory, institutional theory, and, by 
far the two dominant theories: transaction cost economics (TCE) and the resource-based view 
(RBV). In many ways, TCE is the ideal theoretical foundation because it specifically 
addresses make-or-buy decisions based on generic attributes of assets and describes 
appropriate ways to govern customer-supplier relationships. For example, transaction cost 
economics posits that transactions with high asset specificity (essentially customization), high 
uncertainty, and/or occur frequently are best managed internally, while the rest should be 
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more efficiently outsourcedvii. Indeed, a number of  empirical outsourcing studies have found 
that asset specificity, the degree to which assets can be redeployed elsewhere without losing 
value, has been a significant factorviii. RBV has been the second theory most widely-applied  
to the outsourcing contextix. RBV suggests that managers keep valuable, rare, non-imitable, 
and non-substitutable strategic assets in-housex, while potentially outsourcing the rest. TCE 
and RBV are both valuable perspectives. They also guide managers to treat the entire 
business functions as a portfolio of transactions/capabilities--some which must be kept in-
house, some which may be outsourced.   
 
Our most direct assessment of IT as a portfolio has been the  model  developed by Feeny and 
Willcocks (1998)xi. By synthesizing research findings this suggests four broad categories 
which customers must keep in-house, even if they intend to outsource nearly all of the  IT  (or 
another - e.g human resources, legal, procurement, accounting) function: 
• Governance 
• Eliciting and delivering business requirements 
• Ensuring technical ability and architecture 
• Managing external suppliers 
 
Feeny and Willcocks suggest that these four essential tasks can be delivered by nine core 
capabilities. On the technical side,  technical architecture and making technology work are 
vital. Business facing capabilities include relationship building and business systems 
thinking. External supply is managed through vendor development, contract facilitation, 
informed buying and contract monitoring capabilities, while leadership is required along with 
informed buying to support governance and coordination. Table 2 summarizes the activities 




Resource-based view Core capabilities model 
High asset specificity: The  
physical or human assets are
Valuable: activities can be used 
to exploit strategic opportunities 
Governance: strategy, mission, 
and coordination  
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non-redeployable for alternative 
uses or users.  The activities are 
so idiosyncratic & customized 
that keeping them in-house is 
less costly than outsourcing. 
or ward off threats 
High uncertainty: activities 
cannot be clearly defined for 
effective third-party contracting. 
Threat of supplier opportunism 
is high unless customer incurs 
excessive transaction costs.  
Rare: Few competitors offer the 
activities 
Business requirements: 
understanding business needs as 
they relate to the service 
function (IT, HR, etc), and 
relationship building among 
management, users, and the 
service function  
Non-imitable: It is difficult or 
costly for competitors to imitate 
the activity 
Ensure technical ability: The 
architecture operation may be 
outsourced, but the customer 
maintains control over 
architecture design.  
High Frequency: Transactions 
that occur frequently and are 
highly asset-specific are less 
costly if kept in-house. 
Non-substitutable: The  activity 
has no immediate equivalents 
External supplier management: 
Customers must make informed 
buying decisions, monitor and 
facilitate contacts, and seek 
added-value opportunities from 
suppliers. 
Table 2 Different Portfolio Assessment Perspectives: 
What core activities should be kept in-house? 
 
‘Best-Sourcing’ Of  Non-Core Capabilities 
Once organizations identify core IT capabilities, it does not automatically follow  that the 
remaining ‘non-core’ capabilities will be outsourced.  We found that customers who 
considered additional business, economic, and technical factors relating to  non-core 
capabilities were most frequently happy with their sourcing decisionsxii.
A much more complex picture of .’best-sourcing’ practice emerged. From a business 
perspective, some capabilities that are non-core today could become core in the future. 
Outsourcing this non-core function could well impede strategic exploitation in the future.  For 
example, one of our case studies outsourced their web site design and hosting in 1995, which 
initially served as a marketing tool.  As the web became increasingly important to their 
strategy, including online sales and customer service, the customer found their outsourcing 
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relationship impeding the strategic exploitation of the web.  It subsequently terminated the 
supplier at a significant switching cost and brought the function back in-house. 
 
From an economic perspective, some non-core activities may well be more efficiently kept 
in-house.  For example, several of our case study participants were willing to outsource their 
large data centers but could not find suppliers who could do it cheaper.  From a technical 
perspective, some non-core capabilities are highly integrated with other core activities.  This 
makes outsourcing extremely difficult, and we have many examples of organizations that run 
into difficulties as a result. 
 
Assuming non-core capabilities pass these tests, we found clients still needing to  evaluate the 
market options, in order to further validate an outsourcing model and to identify viable 
suppliers, as discussed in the next section. 
 
Evaluation Of  Market Options 
 
An important and on-going sourcing process we identified  was to keep abreast of market 
options, even where an organization was currently largely exclusively in-house.  Recent work 
(Feeny, Lacity and Willcocks, 2005) has identified twelve, potentially core, supplier  
capabilities  along with  practices in four general outsourcing models. These models are: Fee-
for-service (time and materials or exchange-based), netsourcing, joint ventures, and 
enterprise partnerships (see Figure 3).   These models are often blended, such as having a 
joint venture component to structure a shared risk and reward and a traditional outsourcing 
component for operational delivery.  In general, we found each model  most suited to 
particular types of activities, as discussed below. 
 
Time and Materials Model 
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Here, supplier capabilities are bought-in to supplement in-house capabilities under in-house 
management.   A typical example is hiring consultants to help in-house teams implement 
customer relationship management (CRM) systems.  Because requirements are uncertain, the 
customer cannot negotiate a detailed contract, and thus the variable price based on time and 
materials emerged as more appropriate. We found this time and materials model as the most 
common, and  posing the least risk to customers.  
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Table 3: Suitability of Various Outsourcing Models 
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Exchange-Based    or Traditional Outsourcing Contracts 
Here,  the customer pays a fee to the supplier in exchange for a customized product or 
service.  In this model, the customer typically transfers its assets, leases, licenses, and 
personnel to the external supplier. The supplier manages the resources and provides back to 
the customer a set of products and services governed by a one-to-one contract.   
 
In our early studies of IT outsourcing, we found that customers often had naive expectations 
about this model.  For example, many customers expected to save 25% on IT costs by signing 
ten-year, fixed-price contracts for a set of baseline services they assumed would remain stable 
for the duration of the contract.  Many customers subsequently re-negotiated, terminated, or 
switched suppliers mid-stream.  For example, one 2000 survey found that 32% of 
respondents had terminated at least one IT outsourcing contract.  Of those, 51% switched 
suppliers, 34% brought the function back in-house, and the remainder eventually reinstated 
their initial suppliers due to prohibitively high switching costs (Cullen and Willcocks, 2003) .  
 
Survey respondents generally provided a healthy report card for exchange-based outsourcing.   
Thus in one 2001 survey, respondents rated overall supplier performance as “good”, 
respondents realized some or most of the benefits they expected from outsourcing, and 
respondents characterized the majority of problems/issues as only “minor” in nature. This is 
explained by the scope and type of IT outsourcing practiced by responding organizations.   
The vast majority of respondents pursued selective outsourcing; most respondents also used 
multiple suppliers (82%) rather than a single supplier, which allows for best-of-breed supplier 
selection. These results may also be explained by the types of activities selected for 
outsourcing.  For IT, respondents generally targeted stable, non-core IT activities such as 
such as disaster recovery, mainframe operations, network management, midrange operations, 
PC support, and help desk operations rather than IT development or IT strategy (Lacity and 




Here, the customer pays a fee to the supplier in exchange for a standard product or service 
delivered over the Internet or other networks. Netsourcing promises to deliver best-of-breed, 
scalable, and flexible business applications to customer desktops for a low monthly fee based 
on number of users or number of transactions at the customer site.  Customers can rent nearly 
all popular independent software vendor (ISV) products from netsourcing providers, 
including enterprise resource planning (ERP), customer relationship management (CRM), 
personal productivity and communications, e-commerce and e-business packages. Our early 
research  (Kern et al., 2002) shows that this model is suited for customers wanting lower 
back-office costs at the expense of accepting standardized solutions. 
 
The revenues generated in this space are still modest, less than $3 billion annually in 2005.  
Our preliminary research on this space found that early adopters were mainly small to mid-
sized enterprisesxiii. These companies  primarily netsourced standard applications such as 
email, communications, and personal productivity tools.  
 
Customer-Supplier Joint Ventures 
In the joint venture model, the supplier and customer create a new companyxiv. Deals are 
typically structured so that the customer investor provides personnel, becomes the venture's 
first major customer, and shares in future profits if the venture can attract external customers.    
 
In the past, we found joint ventures between customers and suppliers often failed to attract 
external customers and the relationships were redefined as exchange-based.  Examples 
include Delta Airlines and AT&T, Xerox and EDS, and UBS and Perot Systems. But in the 
offshore outsourcing space, joint ventures have been the preferred vehicle for large 
organizations to  create a large offshore facilty without the risks with a fully-owned captive 
center. Customers, such as MasterCard, CSC, Perot Systems, and TRW chose this model over 
a fully owned model to trade off some control in exchange for less risk.  For example, 
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MasterCard created a joint venture with Chennai-based Mpower Software Services called 
MPACT which had 250 employees performing IT work for MasterCard in 2005.  
 
Enterprise-Partnerships 
The goal here is often to transform the back-offices of large organizations that have grown 
through mergers and acquisitions. We have tracked how old ITO and new start-up BPO 
suppliers have entered the new market space from 1999 offering to transform their larger 
customer’s back offices through  leadership, streamlined processes, and new technology (see   
Willcocks and Lacity, 2006).   
 
For example, the UK-based company Xchanging created three joint ventures with customers, 
beginning in 2001.   The first was a joint venture with British Aerospace (BAe) called 
Xchanging HR Services for BPO of human resource management.  Becoming the venture's 
first customer, BAe signed a 10 year contract worth £250 million and transferred 430 HR 
employees to the venture.  The second joint venture named Xchanging Procurement Services, 
also with BAe, provided BPO for procurement.  Again, the venture's first customer was BAe, 
which signed a £800 million, ten-year contract. The third joint venture, with Lloyd's of 
London and the London insurance market generally,  originally called Ins-sure, as at 2006 
continued to provide policy and claims processing BPO.  Lloyd's signed a 10 year contract 
worth £400 million with Ins-sure.  In these three ventures, BAe and Lloyd's were guaranteed 
an undisclosed amount of cost savings on the business process and share in the ventures' 
future profits. In these deals, success will depend partly on Xchanging's ability to deliver on 
the contracts while simultaneously attracting external customers beyond BAe and the London 
insurance market .  
 
Comparing Request-For-Proposal To Internal Bids 
During the last fifteen years, organizations that invited both internal and external bids had a 
higher relative frequency of success than organizations that merely compared a few external 
bids to current performance (89% by 1995, 83% by 2001 successful)xv. We believe that this 
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was because formal external supplier bids were often based on efficient managerial practices 
that could be replicated by internal managersxvi.
In some cases, internal managers could not implement cost reduction tactics because the 
internal politics often resisted cost reduction tactics such as consolidating departments, 
reducing headcount, and standardizing processes and technology. Based on 85 case studies, 
we found that when customers allowed internal bid teams to compete with external suppliers, 
83% of those decisions were successful.  When no in-house bid was invited and existing costs 
were compared with 1 or 2 supplier bids, only 42% of those decisions were successful.  The 
use of an internal bid team served to provide a baseline on what could be attained internally if 
the in-house staff was empowered to behave like a supplier, such as proposing unfavorable 
consolidation and standardization of technology (Lacity and Willcocks, 2001).   
 
Senior Management and Sourcing Decisions.  
Our case study and survey data both suggest that multiple stakeholder involvement and 
strong outsourcing performance are correlated.  In our 2001  survey data, 68% of respondents 
had at least two stakeholders driving the decision, most frequently the back-office manager 
and lawyers or the back-office manager and senior executives.  Our case study data shows 
that joint senior executive/back-office manager decisions or back-office managers acting 
alone had higher relative frequencies of success than senior executives acting alone (Lacity 
and Willcocks, 2001). 
 
We defined decision sponsor as the person who initiated or championed the sourcing decision 
and who made or authorized the final decision. In our study, sourcing decisions made jointly 
with both senior executive and back-office manager input had the highest success rate (76% 
of joint decisions).  It appears that successful sourcing decisions require a mix of political 
power and technical skills.xvii Political power helped to enforce the larger business 
perspective--such as the need for organization-wide cost cuts--as well as the “muscle” to 
implement such business initiatives.   Domain expertise on back-office services, service 
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levels, measures of performance, rates of service growth, and price/performance 
improvements were needed to develop requests-for-proposals, evaluate supplier bids, and 
negotiate and manage sound contracts.  
 
The Crafting Of Outsourcing Arrangements 
This section looks at how organizations craft outsourcing contracts, and with what results.   
 
Exchange-Based Contracts Revisited  
Of the outsourcing models found in Table 3, the exchange-based model is still the most 
common model.  But our data reveals there are several types of exchange-based contracts: 
Standard Contracts: the customer signed the supplier’s standard, off-the-shelf 
contract. This is primarily restricted to the netsourcing space. 
Detailed Contracts: the contract included special contractual clauses for service 
scope, service levels, measures of performance, and penalties for non-performance.   
Loose Contracts: the contract did not provide comprehensive performance measures 
or contingencies but specified that the suppliers perform “whatever the customer was 
doing in the baseline year” for the duration of the contract at 10-30% less than the 
customer’s baseline budget. 
Mixed Contracts: For the first few years of the contract, requirements were fully 
specified, connoting a “detailed” contract.  However, participants could not define 
requirements in the long run, and subsequent requirements were only loosely defined, 
connoting a  “loose” contract. 
 
Detailed contracts achieved expectations with greater relative frequency than other types of 
contracts (75% of detailed contracts were successful).  These organizations understood their 
own functions very well, and could therefore define their precise requirements in a contract.  
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They also spent up to 18 months negotiating the details of contracts, often with the help of 
outside experts. 
 
From our 2001 survey, customers included the following clauses in their detailed contracts:  
• costs (100%),  
• confidentiality (95%),   
• service level agreements (88%),  
• early termination (84%),  
• liability & indemnity (82%),  
• change contingency (65%), and  
• supplier non-performance penalty (62%).   
 
Increasingly, contracts have also included responsibility matrices which outline the 
responsibilities for both customers and suppliers.  This innovation recognizes that suppliers 
sometimes missed service levels because of their customers’ inaction. 
 
No matter how detailed contracts become, changes in requirements occur.  As at time of 
writing, many detailed contracts now have mechanisms of change, including: 
• planned contract realignment points to adapt the contract every few years,  
• contingency prices for fluctuation in volume of demand, 
• negotiated price and service level improvements over time, or even  
• external benchmarking of best-of-breed suppliers to reset prices and service levels.   
 
In contrast to the success of the detailed contract, all seven of the loose contracts we studied 
were disasters in terms of costs and services.  Two of these companies actually terminated 
their outsourcing contracts early and rebuilt their internal departments.   Another company 
threatened to sue the supplier.   Senior executives in these companies had signed flimsy 
contracts under the rhetoric of a "strategic alliance."  However, the essential elements of a 
strategic alliance were absent from these deals.  There were no shared risks, no shared 
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rewards, and no synergies from complementary competencies nor any other of the critical 
success factors identified by researchers.  Instead, these loose contracts created conflicting 
goals.  Specifically, the customers were motivated to demand as many services as possible for 
the fixed-fee price by arguing, “You are our partners.” Supplier account managers countered 
that their fixed-fee price only included services outlined in the contract.  The additional 
services triggered supplier costs which were passed to the customer in terms of excess fees.  
 
Six of the 11 “mixed” contracts we studied achieved expectations.   The contracts contained 
either shared risks and rewards or significant performance incentives.  A Dutch electronics 
company spun-off of the IT department to a wholly-owned subsidiary.   Because the newly-
formed company’s only source of revenue was from the electronics company, the venture 
was highly motivated to satisfy their only client's needs ( Lacity, Willcocks and Cullen, 
2007).     
 
Length Of Contract 
From the customer perspective, there is clear evidence that short-term contracts have higher 
frequencies of success than long-term contracts.  From 85 case studies we studied, 87% of 
outsourcing decisions with contracts of three years or less were successful, compared to a 
38% success rate for contracts eight years or longer.  Short-term contracts involved less 
uncertainty, motivated supplier performance, allowed participants to recover from mistakes 
quicker, and helped to ensure that participants were getting a fair market price. Participants 
also only outsourced for the duration in which requirements were stable. Thus they could 
articulate adequately their cost and service needs.  Some participants noted that short-term 
contracts motivated supplier performance because suppliers realized customers could opt to 
switch suppliers when the contract expired (Lacity, Willcocks  and Cullen, 2007).  
In contrast, long-term contracts have remained troublesome, with failure to achieve cost 
savings as the primary reason. As at 2006, we found that few total outsourcing mega-deals 
had reached maturity without a major stumbling block.  Conflicts are increasingly being 
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resolved through contract re-negotiations. Suppliers, however, have a clear preference for 
long-term relationships to recoup excessive transition and investment costs.  Returning to The 
DuPont/CSC/AC deal, the transition activities lasted over 18 months as the contract was 
operationalized in 22 countries to a population of nearly 100,000 users.  The transition also 
included massive investments by one supplier in IT infrastructure, which the supplier could 
only recoup in a long-term deal.  Clearly, the customer's incentives for short-term deals must 
be balanced with the supplier's incentives for long-term deals. The Dupont arrangements 
were subsequently restructured and renewed, with different terms and a different proportion 
of work to the suppliers, in 2003.   
 
The Management Of  External Relationships 
For all the sourcing models, there is an inherent adversarial nature in ITO and BPO contracts 
in that a dollar out of the customer's pocket is a dollar in the supplier's pocket. A 
knowledgeable, capable customer following good practices up to the point of signing the 
contract may well be sufficiently protected from the devastatingly negative consequences 
experienced in many early 1990s deals.  If a supplier negotiates a favorable deal, it should be 
able to deliver on the contract and still earn a profit margin.  But, as Kern and Willcocks 
(2001)  detail,   even under the most favourable circumstances, relationship management in 
outsourcing has emerged as  difficult. Here we will mention from our consolidated research  
three areas where customers and suppliers found ways of  improving the relationship 
dimension in their outsourcing arrangements. 
 
Core  Capabilities For Managing External Supply  
Earlier we listed none core capabilities that need to be retained in-house. Of these, five are 
orientated toward managing external supply, including Leadership and Informed Buying. 
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These two  tend to be more strategic in orientation, but require relationship skills for dealing 
with senior executives and negotiators within suppliers. The remaining three involve key 
tasks, but also major skills in  and time on relationship management at many different levels 
within the supplier.    
 
Thus contract facilitation is the capability to provide a vital liaison role between the 
supplier and the customer's user and business communities to ensure supplier success. We 
found the role arising  for a variety of reasons, for example to provide one stop shopping for 
the business user; the supplier or user demanded it; users were demanding too much and 
incurring excessive charges.  
 
Contract monitoring is the capability to ensure that the supplier delivers on the contract. 
While the contract facilitator is working to ‘make things happen’ on a day-to-day basis, the 
contract monitor is ensuring that the business position is protected at all times.  
 
Vendor development is the capability beyond the legal requirements of a contract to explore 
increasing ways the customers and suppliers can engage in win-win activities. It is in the 
customer’s interest to maximize the contribution of existing suppliers and guard against what 
we call ‘mid-contract sag’ where minimal contractual commitments are met, but little else.  
 
Relationship Dynamics 
Even with these capabilities in place, we found customer and supplier relationships  
sometimes  troublesome, but the parties still tended to have a good relationship overall.  
Rather than seek to extinguish such troubles, the best relationships embraced the dynamics of 
these quite complex interactions.  We identified four common types of customer-supplier 
interactions: adversarial, tentative, cooperative, and collaborative (Lacity and Willcocks, 
2001) . These are based on the extent of goal alignment for the task at hand: 
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• Tentative interactions occurred when goal alignments are unknown, such as during 
the bidding process.  At such times, each side tended to exaggerate their strengths and 
hide their weaknesses.  
• Adversarial interactions occurred when goals were conflicting, such as interpreting 
which party should pay for something ambiguously stated in the contract. 
• Cooperative interactions occurred when goals were complementary, such as the 
customer wanted the service, the supplier wanted the payment.   
• Collaborative interactions occurred when both sides had shared goals, such as 
educating the user community on what they could expect from the contract.    
 
By attending to the expectations and goals of many outsourcing stakeholders, apparent 
anomalies in relationships could be clarified.  Why, for example, did customer contract 
managers and supplier account managers collaborate to mediate user expectations, then feel 
perfectly comfortable fighting over a monthly bill?   Quite simply, the dynamics of 
stakeholder relationships vary with the task.  
 
Supplier Capabilities 
A major recent stream of our research has focused on an area much neglected in academic 
studies of outsourcing, namely supplier core capabilities. Depending on what is trying to be 
achieved, our work suggest that an outsourcing  supplier needs   three competencies.  
Delivery competency encompasses how well a supplier can respond to the client’s 
requirement for day-to-day operational services.  Transformation competency represents 
how well a supplier can radically improve and even transform cost, quality, and functionality 
in line with the client’s formal and informal expectations.  Relationship competency relates 
to the supplier’s motivation and ability to align with client needs over time.   
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Our on-going work points to twelve capabilities needed to underpin these competencies 
(Feeny et al., 2005).   
• Domain expertise – sufficient professional knowledge of the target process domain to 
meet user requirements  
• Business management – ability to deliver both client service level agreements and 
supplier business and financial goals  
• Behaviour management – ability to motivate  and manage people, including 
transferees,  to deliver  service with a ‘front office’ mind-set. 
• Sourcing – expertise and access to whatever resources are necessary to deliver service 
cost targets 
• Technology exploitation – ability to develop and deploy technology required to meet 
service improvements swiftly and effectively.  
• Process re-engineering – ability to design and implement changes to the service 
process to meet improvement targets 
• Customer development – ability to transition’users’ of a service to ‘customers’ who 
make informed choices about service level and functionality  
• Planning and contracting – ability to develop and contract for business plans which 
deliver ‘win-win’ results for client and provider over time 
• Organizational design – ability to design  and implement organizational arrangements 
which enable access to the capabilities required within the provider firm; and delivery 
of them where and when needed within the client.  
• Governance- establishment and operation of processes which allow service 
performance to be defined and agreed, tracked and assessed over time. 
• Programme management – ability to orchestrate and deploy transformational 
capabilities to successfully achieved required changes over time   
• Leadership – ability to identify, communicate and ensure delivery of the mix of  
delivery, relationship and transformation activities to achieve present and future 
success for client and provider 
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Of these twelve,  six capabilities emerged from our research as  seeming to have major direct 



























Figure 4 – Core Capabilities In The Outsourcing Services Provider  
 
Research Prospects And Conclusion 
 
The IT sourcing literature is already rich with much empirical survey and case research 
findings,  but is still marked by inconsistencies, a plethora of concepts, research approaches, 
ambivalent terminology, and a lack of consistency and common focus  across different 
research groupings. To some extent this reflects the relatively youthful state of IT sourcing 
research, and it could be concluded that the research has been remarkably productive, 
38
rigorous in many respects within individual studies, and also insightful in terms of the 
learnings achieved over time. One can posit that over time researchers will come to 
standardize much more, learn from each other’s studies and begin to appreciate the real value 
in cross-research comparison and indeed of collaborative work.   
As to the outsourcing phenomenon itself, we have consolidated our findings into a rich 
picture of evolution since 1991, from its origins as a relatively small IT services market in 
some sectors, through to the rise of selective multiple supplier sourcing as the consistently 
dominant approach in IT to the time of writing (2006) . At the same time, under semi-
recessionary conditions in the developed economies, business process outsourcing and 
offshore variants of ITO and BPO have greatly increased their share of an ever expanding 
market for external business process and IT services.   We conclude that organizational 
learning on outsourcing has on the whole been quite slow. It may well be  that a lower risk 
approach, and a safer way to  accumulate learning has been  through incremental outsourcing, 
and that customers have adopted this outsourcing strategy precisely to develop in-house 
knowledge about outsourcing.  
 
Having said that,  we regularly find that organizations do not apply their learning well until 
their third or even fourth generation deals. While client organizations may have a history of 
outsourcing experiences to draw upon, the problem is change. First generation outsourcing 
clients often changed what they outsourced and how they outsourced the second and third 
times around. Each time, they found themselves in a relatively new situation, having to learn 
anew. Furthermore, if their knowledgeable people had left and had not been replaced, 
organizational learning could not occur until sometimes the fourth generation deal. At the 
same time people providing the service to a client also move on, and take with them valuable 
knowledge that cannot easily be replaced, and will no longer be applied to improving the 
specific outsourcing arrangement. One of our overall conclusions is that though customer and 
supplier maturity definitely looks set to evolve further in the next five years, we have seen 
few signs of the knowledge issues inherent in outsourcing IT and other back-office functions 
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being addressed in the strategies and practices that these parties brought to bear in the 
outsourcing arena. By 2006 there were promising signs of some studies in this area appearing 
in the academic journals. But it remained to be seen whether practitioners themselves would, 
beyond intellectual property issues,  start recognizing knowledge issues implicit in the act of 
outsourcing large parts of the back-office, let alone standardizing practices on ensuring key 
retained knowledge, and on suppliers possessing and fully deploying complementary 
knowledge in the service of their customers.     
 
What does this all this suggest for future research prospects? Firstly, there is undoubtedly 
work needed on  establishing consistency in definitions so that cross comparisons amongst 
different sets of research studies can be made. The limited ability to carry out such 
comparisons  at the present time limits the contributions different studies make to our 
understanding of this field. Secondly, a profitable line of research is to investigate the issues 
detailed in Figure 3 in the context of new forms of mixed sourcing arrangements as 
offshoring and business process outsourcing gather pace, as predicted to do over the next five 
years. Thirdly,  a major neglected research area remains that of what happens to knowledge 
whenever an organization outsources some or most of its back-office. Fourthly, the 
offshoring phenomenon shows signs of evolving into a more complex global offshore-
nearshore-onshore delivery model. It will be interesting to study how large suppliers take this 
model forward, including the degree to which they sub-contract work themselves, in order to 
achieve requisite geographical coverage  in the light of economic, labour supply, 
infrastructure, and customer requirement considerations. Fifthly, the effectiveness of 
longitudinal case research in the IT sourcing arena needs to be recognised and carried 
forward. This research work has brought  rich evidence on dynamic phenomena, and shown 
that technology, organizational needs, supplier capabilities and contractual completeness 
have not  stayed still for long, and that, to derive fuller understanding and lessons,  research 
as well as management practice in IT sourcing needs to be focused on history, processes, and 
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